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Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 29 November - 10 December 2004

Executive Summary

Future Planning Calendar

(U//~~ATUO~~) **15, 16 & 17 December 2004: Historical Review Panel:** Next meeting at

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(U//~~ATUO~~) **12 January 2005: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Two Weeks

(U//~~ATUO~~) FOIA Requests

(U//~~ATUO~~) Interest in CIA Publication on Magic

(U//~~ATUO~~) The president of a Colorado company seeks a copy of a 1966 publication titled *Magic and How to Recognize It*. The requester notes that his request is "due to my circumstances and position" and that "any other information for urban use would be highly recommended. The following response will be used wisely."

- The FOIA case manager located a copy of the publication from the MORI database of previously released information, and provided it to the requester.

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Note: The introduction to this publication notes the following: "In planning an operation to influence individuals or groups from relatively 'primitive' societies, the planning officer frequently considers magic as an operational tool. Recognizing the 'exotic' nature of the subject, he is likely to seek professional assistance or advice, usually the services of an anthropologist with special knowledge of this area. A briefing paper [has been prepared] that places magic in context as an instrument of social behavior and control."

(U//~~ATUO~~) Request on "Philadelphia Experiment"

(U//~~ATUO~~) An inmate from Texas asks for information regarding "The Philadelphia experiment done in Virginia August 12th, 1943 by US military (Navy)."

- The FOIA case manager informed the requester that we believe the subject of his request refers to an alleged disappearance of a US Navy vessel near Philadelphia during World War II. We advised the requester to contact the US Navy for further assistance.

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(U//~~ATUO~~) CIA Declassification Center

(U//~~ATUO~~) On the Nature of Warning

(U//~~ATUO~~) A self-described "old warner" commenting in June 1982 on the terms of reference for an estimate on the "Warning of War on the Korean Peninsula" noted in his memo the limits of warning. He wrote that "any intelligence information on the possibility of a North Korean attack is likely to be ambiguous and therefore subject to conflicting interpretations. It is understandable that DIA has concentrated on the 'capabilities' and 'military indications' approach, but this preoccupation with Pre H-Hour Scenarios is not an adequate foundation for warning at the 'national' level. In my experience, it has had the effect of encouraging expectations and assumptions about the Community's ability to provide clear warning that are likely to be disappointed. . .it would probably be extremely

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difficult to distinguish between actual preparations for attack and a military bluff. . ." since for warning "to be credible to senior policy makers and political men, it must convey plausible judgments of intentions in the national political/policy context as well as information on military preparations, deployments, logistics, etc." The analyst added that "Our experience over many years has been that warning, in most cases, is an incremental process and that it is hazardous to encourage consumers to expect or rely on receiving 'warning' in a single authoritative statement. The best that the Community normally can manage is to convey a clear message that Country X is taking certain actions that will strengthen its readiness and ability to initiate hostilities. Confident warning judgments usually are beyond reach because of the ambiguity of information, uncertain reliability of sources, and the impossibility of judging intentions with precision and confidence." [REDACTED]

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(U//~~ATUO~~) Soviet Construction Project

(U//~~ATUO~~) A *Current Intelligence Digest* article of September 1952 reports that the Soviet press announced that six officials were awarded the Order of Lenin for the building of the Volga-Don Canal. The Soviet press article names the individuals, but omits their titles. The individuals were Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov and five of his Deputy Ministers. The Embassy comments that failure to give the award to top officials of any other agency leaves little doubt that the MVD was the responsible agency. CIA commented that the Soviet government "did not want to link the infamous MVD, with its millions of forced laborers, to a project supposedly constructed by free socialist labor."

Comment : A contemporary article by a Russian scholar states that during 1930-1953 the "Soviet Gulag-economy" built numerous large projects with forced labor, including the Volga-Don canal and the second trans-Siberian railway among many others. Gulag is an acronym for the Chief Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps, a notorious and extensive system of prisons under the control of the MVD, the Soviet secret police. Some in Russia apparently still prefer to downplay the reality. A Pravda online website article of July 2002 commemorating the canal's 50th anniversary states that "all union republics of the USSR and the best builders took part in construction of the canal." [REDACTED]

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(U//~~ATUO~~) Prelude in G Major (or the sound of tank treads)

(U//~~ATUO~~) From a 14 May 1968 State Department Summary: "US Embassy officers and defense attaches at Budapest find a consensus among their East European colleagues that the Soviets would intervene in Czechoslovakia only were Dubcek to lose control. The Hungarian official line is to play down reports of Soviet troop movements. Western military attaches and diplomats in Budapest have made numerous field trips during the last five days to determine the extent of Soviet military activity in Hungary. They report no indications of preparation for movement of troops in Czechoslovakia. A Czech commentator speaking on Radio Prague's domestic service said commentators all over the world, holding different political views, agree that the USSR would have to have some provocation for intervention--a pretext such as the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact. The US European Command reports evidence that the Soviets are attaining a state of readiness from which to apply a show of force or 'possibly' to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia."

Comment : Because of the drawn-out nature of the Soviet military buildup and the negotiations, varying viewpoints existed at the time among Agency and community analysts concerning the likelihood of any Warsaw Pact troop movement into Czechoslovakia. Eventually, the rise of liberal-leaning Czechoslovak communists and the ascension of Alexander Dubcek as party first secretary and leader in January 1968 sparked debate of unfailing obedience to Moscow, setting off a train of events. Soviet leaders reviled Dubcek's proposal to reconcile Marxism with personal liberty--"socialism with a human face"--which encouraged the discussion of political freedoms during the "Czech Spring." Talks between Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders continued during the spring and summer until, on the night of 22 August, Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia. The Soviet occupation forced Dubcek in October to renounce his reforms. The following April, he was replaced as first secretary by Gustav Husak; at the same time many of the liberal leaders were dropped from the newly streamlined presidium. [REDACTED]

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